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TEXAS LAW AND LEGISLATION
THE EXPERT WITNESS: SELECTION AND
COMPENSATION
N understanding of the difficulties which have arisen in con-
. nection with the obtaining of expert testimony and which
have occasioned recent widespread criticism' requires a brief
review of the development of procedures relating to expert tes-
timony and of its place and purpose in our system of litigation.
Contrary to the belief of many, the admissibility of expert testi-
mony is not an exception to the opinion rule inasmuch as expert
testimony was used by the courts many years before the present
exclusionary rules of evidence, including the opinion rule, de-
veloped.' The earliest expert witnesses were called "to accom-
modate comparatively rare cases involving the crude science of
an earlier day."' Thereafter, as the modern adversary theory
of litigation developed and the distinction between witness and
jury became apparent, reliance upon the expert witness continued
and rules governing such testimony developed along with the
opinion rule and not as an exception to it. Thus the generally
accepted basis for the latter rule is that the opinion of a lay
witness is excluded as merely "superrogatory evidence," while
1 10 N. Y. STATE BAR Asso. REP. (1887) 18; Hand, Historical and Practical Consid-
crations Regarding Expert Testimony (1901) 15 HARv. L. REv. 40; WHARTON AND
STILLE, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE (5th ed. 1905) § 1266; Friedman, Expert Testimony,
Its Abuse and Reformation (1910) 19 YALE L. J. 247; Report of Committee of Board of
Circuit Judges of Wisconsin (1919) 10 J. CRIm. L. & CRIMIN. 188; White, Expert Testi-
mony in Criminal Procedure Involving the Q,,esrion of the Mental State of the Defend-
ant (1923) 11 J. CRIM. L. 499; Shelton, Greater Efficacy of the Trial of Civil Cases
1928) 32 LAw NOTES 45; Moss, The Practicing Physician in Court (1929) 15 A. B. A. J.
497; Report of the Second Judicial Conference of Pa. (1929) 297 Pa. St. xxix; Ander-
son, Expert Testimony, Its Evils (1929-30) FLA. STATE BAR Asso. L. J. 18; Yankwich,
On the Use of Experts (1930) 26 A. B. A. J. 736: White. Judicial , prsus Administra'ive
Process at the Prosecution Stage (1935) 25 J. CRi.t. L. & CRIMIN. 851; 2 WIGMORE, Evi-
DENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 563.
2 Hand, loc. cit. supra note 1.
3 Harno, Uniform Expert Testimony Act (1938) 21 J. Am. JUD. Soc. 156.
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expert testimony is admissible because there have arisen mat-
ters as to which the ordinary knowledge and experience of the
trier of fact is insufficient to enable it to draw all necessary infer-
ences.' Since it is essential that such facts be supplied, the expert
witness is called in to aid the court and the trier of fact by sup-
plementing "the premises upon which the reasoning of the trier
of fact is based with those premises obtained from his experi-
ential qualifications, thereby endowing the trier of fact with
sufficient knowledge to understand the significance of the evidence
and to make the inferences. '
If the. expert is to aid the court and jury by serving as an
adviser on matters of a theoretically absolute nature but with
which the jury is not acquainted, he should be completely unbiased
and disinterested. But under the present system of providing
expert witnesses, it is difficult, if not altogether impossible, for
the expert to fulfill this purpose since he is selected by a party,
compensated by a party, and too often coached by a party. These
incidents are hardly conducive to the desired impartiality-
especially when considered in the light of our adversary system-
since the very nature of the evidence sought to be adduced is
such that partisanship, whether intentional or unintentional, can
rather easily be disguised despite the supposed protection of
cross-examination." The almost inevitable result-testimony of a
somewhat biased characted-has been condemned often and in
unmeasured terms.'
Various recommendations which have been offered to over-
4 7 WIcMORE, EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1940) § 1918.
5 Rosenthal, The Development of the Use of Expert Testimony (1935) 2 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 403. It is to be noted that the "expert may testify to facts he has been
able to observe because of his special skill and from these facts the jury may then draw
the conclusions, or testify as to an opinion of facts for which the jury has not sufficient
experience to arrive at an intelligent opinion." Id. at 404, n. 5. It is the latter testimony
that is more often subject to criticism, since the former is not actually opinion but is
of a more exact nature and not subject to controversy.
6 See MACMILLAN, LAW AND OTiHr THINCs (1937) 250, quoted in 2 WIGMORE, EVI-
DENCE (3rd ed. 1940) § 56L
See note. 1 supra; Legis. (1938) 38 COL. L. REv. 369.
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come these recognized difficulties seem to have certain common
objectives, which may be thus summarized: (1) To provide com-
petent, reliable, and unbiased expert testimony which can justifi-
ably be given weight by the jury;' (2) to assure proper presenta-
tion of all relevant facts upon which the experts may have based
their opinion, thus reducing as far as possible the clashes between
opposing experts which at present confuse rather than aid the jury;
and (3) to provide expert testimony with the least expenditure of
time and money, while at the same time maintaining the inherent
rights of both parties preserved by the adversary form of litiga-
tion and constitutional guarantees. Admittedly such objectives may
not be obtained by correction of any single feature of present prac-
tice, and the problems presented cannot be divorced from other
problems encountered in fields beyond the law of evidence' which
make any simple solution unlikely.'" However, of the many sug-
gestions that have been urged, probably the most practicable and
feasible have dealt with the methods of selection and compensation
of experts"-admittedly two principal grounds for recent criti-
cism-and these deserve further consideration.
SELECTION
For purposes of discussion of the modes of selection of the
witness, expert testimony has been classified on the basis of its
source as, first, that which the court obtains, either by appoint-
ment of its own expert or through some other impartial agency,
and second, that which a litigant obtains. This analysis recog-
nizes the two somewhat conflicting principles which operate in
8 Legis. (1934) 9 Wisc. L REv. 289; 2 WIGMoMr, EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1940) § 563.
' Legis. (1938) 38 COL. L. REv. 369; Report of Medico-Legal Problems Committee
of the Section of Criminal Law for the Am. Bar Asso. (1935) 26 J. CRIm. L. & CRIMIN. 292.
10 Eliasberg, Opposing Expert Testimony (1945) 36 J. CrtM. LAW & CImiMN. 231.
11 See, e.g., Yankwich, On the Use of Experts (1930) 26 A.B.AJ. 736; Bomar, The
Compensation of Expert Witnesses (1935) 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 510; Legis. (1938)
38 COL. L. REv. 369; McCormick, Some Observations upon the Opinion Rule and Expert
Testimony (1945) 23 Tex. L. REv. 109; WicMoie, op. cit. supra note 6; Shelton, loc.
cit. supra note 1.
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this connection, that the expert is to aid the trier of fact as an
impartial observer, and that every party to a suit has a right to
adduce all the evidence in his favor, including that of expert wit-
nesses. Before consideration can be given to the method of selec-
tion of the expert, it must be determined whether the right of a
party to select expert witnesses of his own choice should be pre-
served. This raises the further question whether, under constitu-
tional provisions, such a right can be denied. Some writers assert
that the right of a party to obtain all available evidence for the
prosecution of its cause does not include the right to select ex-
perts, since the experts supply evidence of a very special nature.'
These argue that since the court may summon additional experts
to review testimony already presented 3 and may limit the number
of witnesses called by either side" and since the legislature may
forbid altogether the reception of opinion or expert testimony
for the establishment of any fact in issue upon trial, the legisla-
ture may confirm, and at the same time regulate, the exercise
by-the court of this discretion by prohibiting the use of experts
chosen by either side. These urge that all experts should be
selected by an unbiased, disinterested person," since only by this
method may complete independence-and hence impartiality-
be obtained.
Assuming that a party could be denied the right to call experts
of its own choosing-a matter as to which there is no little doubt"
-it would seem that certain advantages are to be gained by per-
petuation of the present practice that outweigh any disadvantages,
at least if impartial court-appointed experts are also employed to
12 Endlich, Proposed Changes in the Law of Expert Testimony (1898) 32 AM. L.
REv. 851.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.; Frazer v. Jenison, 42 Mich. 206, 3 N.W. 882 (1879) ; People v. Kcrmp, 76
Mich. 410, 43 N.W. 439 (1889).
15 Elliott and Spillman, Medical Testimony in Personal Injury Cases (1935) 2 LAW
& CONTE.MP. PRoB. 467; Hand, loc. cit. supra note 1; Shelton, loc. cit. supra note 1.
' See 2 WICMORF., EvIDENCE (3rd ed. 1940 § 563.
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serve as a check upon party experts. The advantages of such a
combined system of obtaining experts are several: First, it would
preserve the traditional, if not the constitutional, privilege of a
party to adduce all evidence in its favor while at the same time
minimizing the evils of party selection; second, party witnesses
would serve as a check upon the court witnesses and thus insure
against suppression of the truth 7 by exposing any errors resulting
from incompetence or from a "prosecution complex" that might
develop if a particular court expert should be used frequently or
should be closely associated with the court; third, such procedure
would reduce the number of party witnesses,"8 with a saving of
time and expense, since the party witness would be placed in
a somewhat inferior position by reason of the very fact of party
selection and the bias that would be imputed therefrom; and
fourth, the competitive element would be preserved but at the
same time would be regulated by the relative standing of the
party expert in the eyes of the trier of fact, so that in case of a
conflict the trier would probably turn to the court's witness for
guidance." For these reasons it would seem that the party-desig-
nated expert, assuming proper regulation of his selection and
compensation and the addition of a court-appointed expert, could
effectively serve the ends of justice.
Selection of Court-appointed Experts
It is often suggested that court-adduced expert testimony should
be obtained solely through permanently appointed state experts
or a board of experts somewhat similar to those found in con-
tinental countries"0 Under such an arrangement, the permanent
state experts could make investigations as well as present evi-
dence, the role of the party expert being limited to disputing or
17 Ibid.
18 McCormick, loc. cit. supra note 11.
19 Note 16 supra.
20Eliasberg, Opposing Expert Testimony (1945) 36 J. CRIM. L. & CRMIN. 231;
Legis. (1938) 38 COL. L. Rsv. 369.
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disproving the reports and findings of the state experts; or the
permanent state expert might be used merely as another expert
witness. Certainly the state expert under this arrangement would
be free from any partiality toward a party; but in criminal cases,
the very partiality sought to be destroyed might Le minrely shifted
to the side of the state inasmuch as the expert as a member of
the permament legal staff might easily develop, a "prosecution
complex."'" This system has been vigorously opposed both in this
country"2 and abroad"3 on the ground that the arrangement is
subject to political manipulations' and may frustrate the use
of the latest scientific developments2' because of the permanence
of the expert's appointment. Moreover, in view of the tendency
toward specialization and the growing complexity of scientific
endeavor, so great a number of experts would be required that,
even if sufficient experts could be maintained, the system would
seem undesirable because of the considerable expense to the
state which could be avoided by other procedures almost as satis-
factory.
It has also been suggested, as an alternative proposal, that
there could be an assessor"" who would sit with the trial judge
as an advisor. Joint management by the judge and the assessor
of the presentation of expert testimony would result, the assessor
directing annd controlling the examination of expert witnesses and
summing up all expert testimony prior to the judge's charge and
subject to cross-examination by counsel. If the assessor were per-
manent, similar criticisms might be offered here as in the case
of the staff of permanent state experts. The use of experts as
referees"' has been suggested as a simple but satisfactory method
2 Eliasberg, loc. cit. supra note 20.
2 Plascowe, The Expert in France, Germany, and Italy (1935) 2 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 504.
:3 LAILLER ET VONOVEN, LES ER EuRs JUDICIARES ET LEURS CAUSFS (1897) 97 et seq.
-A 2 WIGMOHE, op cit. supra note 8.
" Eliasberg, loc. cit. supra note 20.
Beuweher, The Use ol Experts by the Court (1941) 54 llAnv. L. REv. 1105.
27 Ibid.
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already permitted by the common law and in special cases in the
federal courts, whereby the issues can be simplified before pre-
sentation to the trier of fact. Nevertheless, most courts refuse to
use such power unless expressly authorized by statute. At best,
it would seem that such a system would be of limited utility;
although it could and should be used in many instances, it would
probably not reach the more important cases requiring expert
testimony presented directly to the trier of fact.
Another suggestion, and one which has received the approval
of a number of writers,"' lawyers,2" legislatures, 0 and Congress,'.
would require the court to appoint experts in any case in which
the judge considers it necessary. Such experts would be from
outside the judicial organization; hence a wide range of experts
informed as to recent scientific progress would seem assured.
There has been little criticism or skepticism of this procedure
insofar as it permits the court to decide when an expert should be
called in to aid in the giving of testimony. Questions have, how-
ever, been raised as to the advisability of the court's making the
appointments. 2 The principal grounds of objection at this point
2s Shelton, Greater Efitcacy of the Trial of Civil Cases (1928) 32 LAW NOTES 45;
Elliott and Spillman, Medical Testimony in Personal Injury Cases (1935) 2 LAw &
CONTEMt. PRoB. 467; McCormick, Some Observations Upon the Opinion Rule and
Expert Testimony (1945) 23 TEx. L REv. 109.
20 Report of Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform of the An. Bar Asso.
(1926) 51 A.B.A. REP. 435; (1887) 10 N. Y. STATE BAR Asso. REP. 18; AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE, CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1930) §§ 307 and 308 provide for the appoint-
ment of experts by the court "whenever the issue of insanity or mental defect on the part
of the defendant ... become an issue in the cause .... " See also AMERICAN LAW INS?!-
TUTE. MODEL CODE OF EvInENCE (1942) Rule 403.
so CAL. PEN. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 1027; CAL. CODE CiV. PROC. (Deering, 1931)
1 1871; Colo. Laws 1927, c. 102; IND. ANN. STAT. (Baldwin, 1934) § 2216; WIsc. STAT.
(1933) §357.12. A complete list is to be found in Bomar, The Compensation of Expert
Witnesses (1935) 2 LAW & CONTMP. PRoB. 510.
a FED. RULES CrIM. Pnoc. (1946) Rule 28.
Overholser, The History and Operation of the Briggs Law of Massachusetts (1935)
2 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 437; Legis. (1934) 9 Wisc. L REv. 239. Mr. Stanley H. Fuld
commented on Rule 28 as follows: "I am reminded of an article that Judge Willard Bart-
lett wrote...: I believe that justice in the United States is generally well and honestly
administered; but such a thing is conceivable as that a judge might unwittingly appoint
incompetent official experts who were anything but representative of the best elements
of the medical profession... A man may be a good judge of law and yet be a poor judge
of doctors.'" FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE WITH NOTES AND PROCESDINCS OF
THE INSTITUTE CONDUCTED BY THE NEW YORK UNirvEasiiy SCHOOL OF LAW (1946) 201.
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have been, first, that such appointments would be subject to politi-
cal manipulations, and second, that the court is no more com-
petent than are the parties to select experts.3
Inasmuch as the latter proposal is probably somewhat more
deserving of consideration than either the continental procedure
or the proposal for an assessor or referee, the merit of these
objections may well be examined. As to any danger of political
factors entering in, this risk is ever present where the court exer-
cises discretion, can always be overemphasized, and if deemed
persuasive, would prevent the court's ever being given any dis-
cretionary power. The fact that many courts are hesitant to act
in this connection without statutory sanction3" and that the courts
have not used such power in the past is no serious argument against
its being used. Nor does the previous failure of courts to employ
this procedure3 require the adoption of a more radical departure
if the appointment of outside experts by judges, when deemed
necessary, appears sufficient to insure the desired result. On the
other hand, the suggestion that the judge may not be competent to
select experts seems a more serious objection since the court expert
will be the principal expert and will have recognition as such from
the trier of fact. In answer to this criticism, it has been suggested
that the court's power of selection be guided, e.g., by a list or panel
of experts" prepared by professional or scientific associations"
from which the judge should choose the witnesses. However, the
preparation of such a list would be so difficult at the outset because
of the multiplicity of fields in which experts are from time to
time required that it would be practically impossible to make a
complete list. Moreover, such a system might be open to the
33 Endlich, Proposed Changes in the Law of Expert Testimony (1898) 32 Am. L
REv. 851.
34 Beuscher, The Use of Experts by the Courts (1941) 54 HARV. L R-v. 1105, 1111.
35 Weihofen, An Alternative to the Battle of Experts: Hospital Examination (1935)
2 LAW. & Co NTM.n. PROS. 419.
36 Bomar. The Compensation of Expert Witnesses (1935) 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoS.
510; Eliasberg, loc. cit. supra note 20.
37 See note 33 supra.
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criticism so often provoked by the "performance of a public func-
tion by a non-official body which has no direct responsibility in
the administration of justice.'"" And in any case, such a procedure
would still require the judge to decide in a particular case which
type of expert is needed. Hence it seems that little would be gained
by the preparation of such a list, since the court assuredly has
long been recognized as qualified to pass upon the character and
reputation of the witnesses.
A board of experts possibly could aid the court in deciding
what type of expert would be best qualified in a particular case.
However, again the multiplicity of experts would make such a
procedure somewhat infeasible. It would seemingly be impos-
sible to constitute a single examining board which "would possess
all or even a considerable proportion of the qualifications for the
examination of candidates in all the various branches of knowl-
edge concerning which experts are called to testify, and equally
impracticable to .establish and maintain the requisite large number
of independent examining boards."3 It would seem that in many
cases the judge would be equally competent to select such experts
and should, therefore, be left with discretion in each case. How-
ever, it might be advisable to have the counsel for the parties
nominate or recommend experts for the judge's consideration,
since these representatives of the parties have made a thorough
investigation of the particular case and would be well advised
as to the type of witness best qualified; moreover, counsel would
probably be hesitant to suggest an expert of bad character or repu-
tation. Thereupon the judge could choose those best qualified as
to reputation and character and scientific knowledge and might
select another expert of his own choice but within the field indi-
cated.
In any case it would seem advisable that more narrow defini-
38 Taft, Opinion Evidence of Medical. Witnesses (1927) 14 VA. L. REV. 81.
39 Foster, Expert Testimony-Prevalent Complaints and Proposed Remedies (1897)
11 HAa v. L. REv. 169, 184.
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tions of expert capacity be formulated and that statutory qualifi-
cations be provided for certain types of experts."0 This procedure
has been adopted in several states,4 ' and although its application
to the entire field of expert testimony is not feasible, it seems
desirable as to the more important and frequently used classes
of experts. Such prescribed qualifications could serve the dual
purpose of guiding both the parties and the judge in the selection
of experts.
Selection of Party-appointed Experts
Of the procedures available for the regulation of the selection
of party experts, it would seem that one of the most promising
methods would be to require that all selections be made from a
list prepared by professional or scientific groups and approved
by the court. However, as has been pointed out previously, this
procedure involves difficult problems of administration. On the
other hand, a somewhat more practical procedure would be to
require the approval by the trial judge of each appointment of
an expert witness2 before presentation of their testimony; by
this method, it should be possible to eliminate experts undesirable
because of unsatisfactory reputations. Or, to go a step further, it
would seem quite desirable, so long as a party designates expert
witnesses, that they should then be appointed by the judge and
compensated through the court, as will be discussed elsewhere.
By this method, the parties would be comparatively free to adduce
all witnesses in their favor; at the same time, the appointment
by the court and compensation by or through the state should
insure the witness' independence and freedom from bias. Of
course, if this proposal is deemed too far reaching or if its adop-
40 See note 33 supra.
41 CAL. PEN. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 1027 (Court must appoint two or three alienists,
at least one of whom must be from the staff of State institution) ; LA. CODE CRIM. LAW
& Paoc. (Dart, 1943) § 267; N. Y. CODE CftM. Peoc. (1939) § 659.
42 Morgan, Suggested Remedy for Obstructions to Expert Testimony by Rules of
Evidence (1943) 10 U. oF Cut. L. Rav. 285.
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tion in its entirety would unduly burden the trial judge, its fea-
tures might be resorted to only in part and as practicable in order
to aid in "freeing" the party expert to give unbiased testimony.
However, since the party witness will be placed in a somewhat
inferior position if court-appointed experts also participate, the
method of selection of the party witness would become a some-
what less urgent problem than at present when court-appointed
witnesses are not generally available. And, in any event, cross-
examination will remain a more or less effective safeguard to
reveal the qualifications and predispositions of the party witness."8
COMPENSATION
The problem of compensation of the expert witness is closely
related to that of the proper method of selection, the objective
being in either case to assure the independence of the expert and
resulting impartiality.
It might be suggested first of all that the compensation of the
expert witness be limited to the amount of remuneration of the
ordinary witness." Although such is the prevailing rule in the
absence of statute as to the expert's fees for testimony on the
stand, "' this method of payment would not take into account those
fees which must necessarily be paid for special services rendered
by the expert outside of the court, for which all courts agree that
additional compensation is proper."' And if there were a policy
against compensation for such preliminary work, the whole sys-
tem of adducing expert testimony probably would be impaired
since the expert would perhaps refuse to make the preliminary
4s 2 WicoiRF, EvmENCE (3rd ed. 1940) § 561.
44 See Bartlett, Medical Expert Evidence: The Obstacles to Radical Change in the
Present System (1909) 34 AM. L. RE'v. 1, 7.
15 8 WicmoR., EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1940) § 2203; Rocgms, EXPMlT TESTIMONY (2nd
ed. 1891) § 188.
4'Ex Parte Dement, 53 Ala. 389 (1875); Wright v. People, 112 Ill. 540 (1884);
Dixon v. People, 16R 1l. 179. 48 N.E. 109 (1897): State v. Darby, 7 Ohio Dec. 725
(1886) ; Summers v. State, 5 Tex. App. 365 (1879) ; Rocts, op cit. supra. note 45, § 183.
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study or examination which in most cases is an indispensable
requisite. Such additional compensation, therefore, seems neces-
sary, and England4" and most states"8 have seen fit o authorize
additional compensation of the expert in this connection. However,
statutes enacted for this purpose have generally been designed
merely to protect the expert and assure him of adequate com-
pensation rather than to protect the system as a whole from abuse.
It has also been urged by many writers that the expert should
be compensated entirely by the state. ' Although such a system
has been championed as the one wholly reliable method of obtain-
ing complete freedom of the expert and of assuring at the same
time all the advantages of expert testimony, yet if the estimate
that sixty per cent of all cases require expert testimony is at all
accurate, " the method proposed would increase the public expense
of operation of the judicial system substantially, notwithstanding
that in any such system there would necessarily be imposed some
limitation on the number of witnesses which each side could pro-
duce. For this reason, Wigmore"' and others" have suggested that
only in the case of court-appointed witnesses should compensation
be paid by the state, each party being allowed to compensate its
own witnesses. This obviously would reduce the drain on state
funds for this purpose; moreover, any party would be assured,
in view of the presumably qualified court experts who would also
4"Webb, Page 1 Carr. and K. 23 (1843).
48 A complete survey of the statutes in force in the various American jurisdictions
has been made in Bomar, The Compensation of Expert Witnesses (1935) 2 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROs. 510, 518, n. 57.
411 Friedman, Expert Testimony, Its Abuse and Reformation (1910) 19 YALE L J.
247; Report of Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform of the Am. Bar Asso.
(1926) 51 A.B.A. REP. 428; Shelton, Greater Eflicacy of the Trial of Civil Cases (1928)
32 LAW NOTES 45; Note (1910) 1 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMIN. 125; Elliott and Spillman,
Medical Testimony in Personal Injury Cases (1935) 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 467.
50 WELLMAN, ART OF CRo6s EXAMINATION (1929) 60; Harno, Uniform Expert
Testimony Act (1938) 21 J. AM. JuD. Soc. 156; Schofield, Medical Expert Testimony;
Methods of Improving the Practice (1910) 1 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMIN. 41.
51 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 563.
5 2 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1930) § 309; McCor-
mick, Some Observations upon the Opinion Rule and Expert Testimony (1945) 23
TEx. L. REv. 109.
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offer testimony, of competent expert testimony, regardless of the
financial means of any party litigant. Such procedure has been
provided for in several states"" and recently in the new Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure.' There remains the further ques-
tion as to the proper manner of compensating the party witness.
This might be accomplished by taxing compensation as costs,55
a result which would require statutory authorization since it is
generally held that, in the absence of statute, "compensation
of experts beyond the regular witness fee is not a necessary dis-
bursement and cannot be taxed as costs." ' However, such a pro.
cedure, if adopted with reference to party witnesses, would not
alone remedy the deficiencies of the present system. Such a sys-
tem would assuredly require the court to limit the number of
witnesses and to set or approve the fees paid, both of which
results are probably desirable; but such costs, as "a pecuniary
allowance, made to the successful party"' are based on expenses
already incurred; and only after the conclusion of the trial-after
both parties have paid experts of their own choosing a compensa-
tion privately agreed upon-would costs be determined. Hence,
even if the court is given more control over compensation, since in
many cases it is not actual bribery or dishonesty that results in
bias but merely the witness' desire to give "his client his money's
worth,"" s the expert's independence from indirect party control
would not be completely achieved.
On the other hand, the taxing of the compensation of the court-
': E.g., in California. See CAL. CODE Civ. PRoC. (Deering, 1931) § 1871 (in Criminal
cases, expenses of court appointed witness charged to county, in civil cases, struck off as
costs). See also R. I. GN. LAWS (19381 c. 537, § 20 (in criminal cases at discretion of
court) ; LA. CODE ov CRim. LAW & PRoc. (Dart, 1943) § 267; Wis. STAT. (1933) § 357.12.
54 FED. RULES CRIM. PRoc. (1946) Rule 28.
53 Lobingier, Compensation of Expert Witnesses (1925) 59 Am. L. REv. 266; Bomar,
loc. cit. supra note 48.
56 Bomar, supra note 48, at 517; The William Branfoot v. Hamilton, 52 Fed. 390
(C. C. A. 4th, 1892); Vaulkner v. Hendy, 79 Cal. 265. 21 Pac. 754 (1889) ; Board of
Com'rs of Larimer County v. Lee, 3 Colo. App. 177, 32 Pac. 841 (1893).
57 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1933).
58 Bomar, loc. cit. supra note 48.
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appointed experts as costs appears to have some merit." Thus
would be allocated as costs only the charges of an impartial
adviser of the court who would be called only when the judge
feels that justice would thereby be served; neither party would be
unduly burdened, and the state would not be compelled to bear
the costs incident to obtaining expert testimony. A somewhat sim-
ilar procedure has been proposed by the American Law Institute
in its Model Code of Evidence."" Nevertheless, it does seem that
compensation by the state of court-appointed witnesses would be
preferable, since it would assure the expert a fair compensation
in all cases; after all, the expert would in a true sense be an agent
of the court whose compensation properly should be considered
the state's obligation.
As to the compensation of the party's witnesses the suggestion
has been made in some quarters'' that payment should be made
by the parties with the amount being set by the court. Undoubtedly
such a procedure would be preferable to merely taxing the expert's
fees as costs; and the supervision by the court over the fees paid
would assure fewer purchases of actually perjured testimony or
contingent fee contracts. An interesting variation from this for-
mula might be that of requiring notice to, and approval by, the
court of the fee of the expert before admittance of such testi-
59 See McCormick, Some Observations upon the Opinion Rule and Expert Testi-
mony (1945) 23 TEx. L. REv. 109.
60 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE (1942) § 410: "The com-
pensation of each expert witness appointed by the judge shall be fixed at a reasonable
amount. In a criminal action it shall be paid by (insert proper public authority) under
order of the judge. In a civil action it shall be paid as the judge shall order; he may
order that it be paid by the parties in such proportion and at such times as he shall pre-
scribe, or that the proportion of any party be paid by (insert name of the proper author-
ity), and that, after payment by the parties or (public authorities) or both, all or part
or none of it be taxed as costs in the section. Any witness appointed by the judge who
receives any compensation other than that fixed by the judge and any person who pays
or offers or promises to pay such other compensation shall be guilty of contempt of
court. The fee of an expert witness called by a party but not appointed by the judge
shall be paid by the party calling him but shall not be taxed as costs in the action."
See also FEi. RULS OF CRIM. PROC. (1946) Rule 28; Model Expert Testimony Act, 9
UNIFORM STATE LAWS (Snpp. 1944) 41; AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE (1930) § 309.
61 See note 48 supra.
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mony.E However, both procedures are subject to the criticism
that the party is after all the source of the fee and, as aptly put
by one writer, "It is doubtful that the alleged partisanship of
expert testimony is due in many cases to witnesses who have sold
out to the highest bidder; much of the partisanship, perhaps, is
due to an uncommon striving to support the cause of the party
who will pay his fee, be it large or small.""ca In order to obtain
a method more conducive to independence, there has been devised
a procedure whereby it is felt that the complete independence
of the expert may be achieved and yet without burdening the state
with the expense of such fees. This method would require an
amount, set by the court," to be paid into court (or bond in lieu
thereof) by the party calling the witness; it would then be paid
by the court on the termination of the litigation or upon the con-
clusion of the necessary use of the expert. This procedure, coupled
with the suggested method of appointment by the court upon
nomination of the respective parties, would seem to obtain the
greatest independence feasible and still maintain the right of either
party to adduce his own witnesses. It would assure the expert of
compensation regardless of the outcome of the suit, and he would
look to the court rather than to a party for compensation. In any
event, any rule or statutory provision regulating the payment of
a party expert should make it a criminal offense to offer or accept
a fee greater than that stipulated by the court and requiring the
expert to take an oath to this effect.
Although this note has dealt altogether with mechanical aids
and procedures, it is recognized that one of the most effective




65 "As long as the standards of the profassion countenance this abuse so long will it
continue. Whenever the good lawyers will not, the shysters cannot continue to misuse
expert testimony." Friedman., Expert Testimony. Its Abuse and Reformation (1910)
19 YALE L. J. 247, 255. See also Taft, Opinion Evidence of Medical Witnesses (1927)
14 VA. L. Rrv. 81.
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If the two methods of reform can be joined in application, the
usefulness of the expert in the administration of justice will be
greatly extended. While the problems presented by the use of
expert testimony are not completely solved by the reduction of the
evils engendered by partisan experts, such a step is nevertheless
of the greatest importance.
1. P. Wandel.
